Yugoslavia Today, October 23rd

BELGRADE, Oct 23, 2000 -- (RFE/RL) The Serbian power-sharing agreement signed by supporters of the new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and the remnants of the regime of his successor, Slobodan Milosevic, raises major moral questions as well as reasonable doubt about the future of democracy in Serbia.

Power-sharing not only creates a credibility question for President Kostunica and the 18 parties in his coalition; it is an approach that may have devastating consequences for the democratic process in Serbia. By entering a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Kostunica is in effect legitimizing Milosevic's organization in the eyes of the public and the international community. He is giving this party a chance to mutate into another form of post-totalitarian communist formation that will continue playing a destructive role in Serbian society.

Why is Kostunica willing to do such a favor for his rivals, who falsified the election results and ordered the use of force against Serbian protestors? Certainly not because he is a supporter of Milosevic. Kostunica is regarded as a constitutionalist, who believes in the rule of law and seeks legality in any governmental changes. He wants to prevent any unrest or bloodshed, and this is the likely reason for his cautiousness. However, Milosevic and his supporters are obviously taking advantage of the new president's approach and are trying to entangle him in a web of constitutional and legal obstacles to forestall comprehensive reform.

Two weeks ago it appeared that not only was Milosevic finished but that his regime had come to an end. The protestors on the streets of Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia insisted on his arrest and stormed the parliament and other government buildings. In other words, they were denying authority not only to Milosevic but to the entire Socialist edifice. The protesting crowds were much more radical than the opposition leadership and were ready to take responsibility in eliminating the power of Milosevic and his supporters. But Kostunica failed to arrest Milosevic. He also repeated his previous refusal to turn Milosevic over to The Hague, which he has called "an American and not an international court." He then began making deals with Milosevic's close associates, some of whom are also indicted war criminals, such as Serbian President Milan Milutinovic.

In fact, two weeks after the "revolution," Serbia is still the only country in the world to be led by a president who has been indicted by an international tribunal for war crimes--because nobody has overturned or challenged the authority of Milutinovic. In the meantime, Milosevic continues giving instructions to his party faithful on how to retain as much power as possible. And they appear to be managing this task quite successfully, both on the Serbian and Yugoslav levels, despite some calls from within the SPS for Milosevic to quit as party leader.

While it may be argued that Kostunica's steps are only temporary measures aimed at a peaceful and smooth transition until the Serbian elections in December, it appears that Kostunica evidently did not look closely at the experience of some of Serbia's neighbors. He failed to estimate how compromises with old communist establishments can become dangerous, even in cases where no war crimes are involved. When the Bulgarian opposition agreed 10 years ago to participate in a roundtable with the Communist Party, that move was perceived as a great democratic achievement. Several years later, however, some of the opposition leaders admitted that it was one of the biggest mistakes committed by the democratic forces.

First, it gave the Communists the status of a legitimate participant in the democratic process, even though the party had not come to terms with its own role in decades of terror, atrocities, political repression, and forced ethnic assimilation.

Second, the roundtable agreements gave an impetus for the revitalization of the 100-year-old Bulgarian Communist Party, which included not only changing its name to "Socialist" but also propelling it to occupy the social democratic space in the political system and in public perceptions. Five months later, the Socialists defeated the democrats in the general elections and continued to rule the country.

The "back-to-power" strategy of the Bulgarian Socialists also consisted of carefully constructing mechanisms to divide the opposition and undermine the credibility of opposition leaders. This led to a long period of Socialist domination in the parliament and a devastating economic catastrophe in 1997. At this point, the united opposition leaders demanded the immediate resignation of the Socialist cabinet and parliament. They also formed an interim government on their own, even though mass protests supporting the opposition were threatened with a military crackdown.

At a time when Kostunica has the full support of the army and the police, there is no credible reason for making deals with a party responsible for triggering four wars, launching ethnic cleansing, and creating a criminal environment throughout the region.

Moreover, once the euphoria subsides, Serbia faces the prospect of growing public frustration with worsening living conditions and the consequences of the wholesale criminalization of the economy. Clearly, the Socialists will seek to benefit from a potential public backlash and from splits within the Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition in order to launch themselves back into positions of power, with or without Milosevic. The experiences of at least some of Serbia's neighbors should serve as lessons rather than as models.